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T
he purpose of this paper is to investigate the
extent to which market participants anticipate
Federal Reserve policy actions. The topic is
central to macroeconomics. Since the early 1970s
theorists have emphasized that a complete model
of the economy requires a full specification of the
behavior of policymakers. Otherwise, there is no
way to model the expectations upon which private
agents base their decisions.
The recent trend in monetary policy has been
toward greater transparency, accountability, and
credibility. This trend is largely explained by two
ideas. First, the economics profession has accepted
the proposition that monetary policy is the funda-
mental determinant of inflation in the long run.1
Second, central bank credibility and clear market
expectations about monetary policy are critical to
policy success.2
The key theoretical development in this context
was the application of rational expectations to
macroeconomics and the statement of the famous
Lucas critique. Lucas (1976) argued that the economy
and policymakers are interdependent. Specifically,
the public forms expectations of the dynamic feed-
back rule that policymakers follow to implement
policy. This line of argument led naturally and imme-
diately to the distinction between expected and
surprise policy actions and a number of papers
exploring their different effects on the economy.3
For example, the more transparent the central bank,
the less likely that it will be able to institute a sur-
prise inflation to temporarily raise output growth.
Our purpose is not to add to the extensive theo-
retical literature, but instead to document in consid-
erable detail the extent to which U.S. monetary
policy has become increasingly open and trans-
parent. The trend toward greater transparency has
been especially evident in recent years.4 In 1994,
the FOMC began the practice of announcing policy
actions immediately upon making them, and in
1995 the practice was formally adopted.5 Since
August 1997 the FOMC has included a numeric
value of the “intended federal funds rate” in each
directive. Since May 1999 a press statement has
been released at the conclusion of every meeting.
These press statements initially included a numeric
value for the “intended federal funds rate” and a
statement of the “policy bias.”
In February 2000 the FOMC replaced the “policy
bias” in the Directive that had been used since
February 1983 with a statement of the “balance of
risks.”6 In this statement the FOMC indicates its
beliefs about how the risks of heightened inflation
pressure and economic weakness are balanced over
the foreseeable future. The new language was not
intended to indicate the likely direction or timing
of future policy moves.
These moves toward greater openness and
transparency should have increased the ability of
markets to anticipate policy actions. Poole and
Rasche (2000) and Kuttner (2001) used data from
the federal funds futures market to estimate the
extent to which the market has anticipated the Fed’s
actions. While their methodologies differ slightly,
1 There is a continuing debate, however, about exactly how central
banks control the long-run inflation rate and the relative importance
of money. For further discussion, see McCallum (2001).
2 In the final analysis, credibility is earned—central banks will be known
by their actions, not by their words. The Swiss National Bank and the
Bundesbank had considerable credibility because they kept the infla-
tion rate low. See Meyer (2001) for a discussion of the need to earn
credibility.
3 A number of arguments have been advanced for why only surprise
policy actions matter. Recently, Woodford (2001) presented arguments
against several of these propositions. Indeed, he shows that in models
with forward-looking expectations, what matters is the market’s expec-
tation of future policy. The remaining argument against expected
policy having real effects occurs if prices adjust very rapidly to expected
policy actions. In such an environment, policymakers would be unable
to change the stock of real money and, consequently, unable to affect
any real variable. For a recent attempt to differentiate empirically
between the effects of expected and unexpected policy actions, see
Hoover and Jorda (2001).
4 In its landmark Freedom of Information Act case (Merrill vs. FOMC)
that was argued before the U. S. Supreme Court in 1976, the Fed vigor-
ously defended the need for secrecy. See Goodfriend (1986) for a
discussion of the Merrill case and the Fed’s arguments. 
5 For a detailed history of the Fed’s disclosure practice, see Rasche (2001).
6 See Thornton and Wheelock (2000) for a detailed analysis of the policy
bias statement.
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© 2002, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.both looked at the reaction of the federal funds
futures rate on days when the Fed changed the funds
rate target; in this way, they estimated the extent to
which the market was surprised by Fed actions. The
expected target change is obtained by subtracting
this estimate from the actual target change. These
measures were then used to estimate the response
of market rates to unexpected changes in policy.
Both analyses find that Treasury rates responded
significantly to unexpected target changes, but not
to expected target changes.
This paper extends this literature in several
important directions. First, because this methodology
requires that market participants know that the Fed
has changed the funds rate target, we perform the
analysis separately over the two periods: pre-1994
and post-1993. (Pre-1994 refers to the period
before the February 4, 1994, FOMC meeting; post-
1993 refers to the period after that meeting.) As of
February 4, 1994, there is no doubt that the market
has been aware each time the target was changed
because each change has been announced. Before
1994 the market’s knowledge of Fed actions cannot
be taken for granted. Consequently, we undertake a
detailed analysis of what the market knew about Fed
policy actions before 1994 to determine instances
when market participants were and were not aware
that the target had changed.
Second, we show that the Poole/Rasche and
Kuttner methodology eliminates part, but not all,
of the measurement error associated with identify-
ing unexpected changes in the funds rate target.
Failure to account for the remaining source of mea-
surement error results in a downward bias in the
estimate of the response of the Treasury rates to
unexpected target changes. We implement an errors-
in-variables estimator to correct for this bias.
Third, we attempt to identify the extent to
which market participants were surprised by the
Fed’s inaction. That is, we identify dates when the
market expected the Fed to act but no action was
taken. This is particularly relevant for the post-1993
period. Given the FOMC’s practice since 1993 of
changing the target primarily at regularly scheduled
meetings, it is reasonable to assume that there may
have been instances when the market was expecting
an action that the FOMC did not take. The absence
of action may have prompted market participants
to revise their expectation for the future funds rate.
Fourth, we investigate how far in advance the
market appeared to correctly anticipate a policy
action. The Poole/Rasche and Kuttner methodology
indicates only whether the market anticipated the
Fed’s action at the time the action was taken; it does
not provide information about how far in advance
the market expected the action. This measurement
required a detailed analysis of what the market
expected and the behavior of longer-term federal
funds futures rates.
Finally, we provide additional evidence that
the recent trend toward greater transparency has
significantly increased market participants’ ability
to anticipate Fed actions.
IDENTIFYING UNEXPECTED MONETARY
POLICY ACTIONS
One problem in estimating the response of the
economy to exogenous policy actions of the Fed has
been that it has been difficult to isolate a variable
that measures such actions. The search for a single
measure of exogenous Fed policy actions has been
hampered by the fact that the Fed has changed its
emphasis in conducting monetary policy over the
years.
The practice of changing operating procedures,
and in some instances changing policy objectives,
combined with the lack of transparency about either
the Fed’s objectives or its operating procedure makes
it very difficult to isolate one variable that reflects
Fed policy actions. It is hardly surprising that a num-
ber of variables—growth rates of monetary and
reserve aggregates, changes in the discount rate,
and short-term interest rates, particularly the over-
night federal funds rate—have been used as mea-
sures of Fed policy actions.
Knowing the Fed’s policy instrument is an
important element for assessing the effect of mone-
tary policy actions, but it is not the only element. If
markets are efficient, anticipated policy actions are
already reflected in economic variables—markets
respond only to unexpected policy actions. To iden-
tify the effect of policy actions on the economy, the
observed policy instrument must be partitioned
into its expected and unexpected components.
Failure to distinguish between expected and unex-
pected policy actions gives rise to a measurement
problem, which biases downward the estimated
response of economic variables to a change in the
policy instrument. To correctly assess the impact of
policy actions, then, the policy instrument must be
known, observed, and partitioned into its expected
and unexpected components.
There is little difficulty in identifying policy
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has explicitly targeted the federal funds rate during
this period and there is evidence that the market
was aware that the Fed targeted the funds rate as
early as 1989. In addition, in October 1988 the
Chicago Board of Trade began trading federal funds
futures contracts. A federal funds futures contract
is a bet on the average effective federal funds rate
for the month in which the contract matures. Conse-
quently, the federal funds futures rate reflects the
market’s expectation for the average level of the
federal funds rate for that month. In this environ-
ment, the federal funds futures rate is a nearly ideal
measure of the market’s expectation of Fed policy.
To illustrate, let ffft
h denote the rate on the h-month
federal funds futures contract on day t. Note that
(1) ,
where ffi
h denotes the federal funds rate on day i of
the hth month, Et denotes the expectation on day
t, and m denotes the number of days in the month.
Now assume that the Fed is targeting the federal
funds rate and that the funds rate stays very close
to the target, i.e., 
(2) ,
where fft* denotes the Fed’s target for the federal
funds rate on day t and ηt denotes a mean zero, but
not necessarily i.i.d., random variable.7 Substituting
(2) into (1) yields
(3) .8
On day t, the change in the h-month federal
funds futures rate would be
(4) .
Suppose that on day t there is a change in the
intended funds rate that is expected to persist for
h months or longer. If market participants correctly
anticipate both the timing and the magnitude of
the Fed’s action, the h-month-ahead federal funds
futures rate would not respond to the action, i.e.,
∆ffft
h=0. The change in the h-month-ahead federal
funds futures rate on days when the market knows
that the Fed has changed its funds rate target is a
measure of the unexpected change in the target, so
long as the new target is expected to persist for the
term of the futures contract. The expected target
change can be calculated by subtracting this number
from the actual target change.
Poole/Rasche and Kuttner use this procedure
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to identify unexpected policy actions. Poole and
Rasche use the change in the 1-month federal funds
futures rate on the day the target was changed. On
the first day of the month fff
1
t–1 is replaced by the
futures rate on the 2-month contract for the last
day of the previous month.
In contrast, Kuttner estimates the unexpected
target change using the current month’s futures
rate contract. Specifically, Kuttner’s estimate of the
unexpected target change is
(5) ,
where ffft
0 is the value of the current month’s federal
funds futures rate on the tth day of the month and
m is the number of days in the month. On the first
day of the month, fff
0
t–1 is replaced by the futures
rate on the 1-month contract on the last day of the
previous month. On the last three days of the month,
Kuttner uses the Poole/Rasche measure of the unex-
pected target change.
Knowledge of Fed Actions
These measures presume that market partici-
pants are aware of the target change. If the market
participants are unaware that the target has changed,
expectations for the funds rate would not necessar-
ily reflect expectations for the Fed’s policy instru-
ment. Even if market participants were aware that
the Fed had taken some policy action, evidenced,
for example, by a change in the discount rate, the
change in the federal funds futures rate would not
necessarily reflect the “unexpected change in the
funds rate target.”
Likewise, if market participants do not know
that the target has changed on a particular day,
that day’s change in the federal funds futures rate
could not measure the unexpected change in the
funds rate target. Indeed, on such days the change
in the futures rate would normally be relatively
small, which might be interpreted as the market
having expected the target change. In truth, how-
ever, market participants would be simply unaware
that the target had changed.
After 1994, knowledge of FOMC actions is not
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7 There is some well-documented persistence in deviations of the funds
rate from the funds rate target. For example, see Taylor (2001).
8 This and subsequent analyses ignore the possibility of a small premium
in the futures market, documented by Robertson and Thornton (1997),
because any such premium is so small that its existence would have
a negligible impact.
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ing target changes immediately.9 Knowledge of
target changes before 1994, when target changes
were not announced, is problematic. The process
of knowing when the target was changed was further
complicated by the fact that during this period most
target changes were made between, rather than at,
FOMC meetings. Furthermore, until late 1989 (when
the Fed appears to have adopted the practice of
changing the target only in multiples of 25 basis
points), target changes of various amounts smaller
than 25 basis points were common.
THE MARKET REACTION TO 
UNEXPECTED TARGET CHANGES—
POST-1993
In this section we estimate the response of
market rates to unanticipated changes in the funds
rate target. We begin by analyzing the post-1993
period. The policy action on February 4, 1994, is
excluded from our analysis because this is the first
time that the FOMC announced its decision. Since
there was no information prior to the conclusion
of that meeting to indicate that such an announce-
ment would be forthcoming, market reaction was
conditioned on less information than at subsequent
meetings.
To estimate the response of various Treasury
rates to changes in the funds rate target, Poole/
Rasche and Kuttner estimated the equation
(6) ,
where ∆it denotes the change in the selected
Treasury rate and ∆fft* edenotes the expected change
in the funds rate target, i.e., ∆fft* e=∆fft*–∆fft* u.
Ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimates of β1
and β2 are biased because the measures of the unex-
pected target change suffer from measurement error.
The measurement error arises because each day
markets process information that comes in various
forms. While special attention is paid to headline
news—reports of major government statistics,
announcements of funds rate target changes, etc.—
market participants process information from a
variety of other sources that are less easily identified.
Hence, federal funds futures rates change even on
days when there is no headline news or a target
change. Such ambient news is included in the Poole/
Rasche and Kuttner measures of the unexpected
change in the funds rate target.
We adjust for the errors-in-variable bias using a
classic econometric approach. It is convenient to
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Errors-in-variables bias arises when one of the
variables is measured with error. To illustrate the
problem and the corresponding errors-in-variables
estimation, assume that 
(9) ,
where ∆fft* um is an estimate of the true unexpected
change in the funds rate target and ut is a random
measurement error that is uncorrelated with ∆fft* u.
Substituting (9) into (8) yields
(10)
It is clear from (10) that ∆fft* um is negatively corre-
lated with ϖt, which will bias the estimate of (β2–β1)
down. The classic errors-in-variables estimator
makes use of the assumptions that Eut=Eεt=0 and
Eutεt=0. Under these assumptions, the covariance
between (β2–β1)∆fft* um and ϖt is –(β2–β1)σu
2, where
σu
2 is the variance of the measurement error.10
Identifying Ambient Variation in the
Futures Rate
The application of the classic errors-in-variables
estimation technique requires a measure of the
variance of the shock associated with the ambient
news. We accomplish this by identifying all of the
policy events since 1994. A policy event is either a
meeting of the FOMC or an intermeeting target
change. During this period all but four of the target
changes occurred at regularly scheduled FOMC
meetings. There were 62 such events from March
1994 through May 2001. We then read the front page
and the Credit Markets column of the Wall Street
Journal (WSJ) at least two days before each of these
events to infer what the market anticipated would
happen on “event days.”
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9 The FOMC formally adopted this practice as a procedure at its January-
February 1995 meeting.
10 For more details, see Johnston (1963, pp. 168-70).
Poole, Rasche, Thornton REVIEWOn meeting days when the target was not
changed, we concluded that the market anticipated
that no action would be taken if the commentary
suggested that market analysts overwhelmingly
believed that no action would be taken. We inferred
that the market anticipated no action when the WSJ
reported there was a “consensus” or “unanimity”
among market analysts.
When the funds rate target was changed, we
required market analysts to correctly anticipate
the magnitude of the target change. In many cases
the WSJ reported the results of a survey. In these
instances, we inferred that the market correctly
anticipated the FOMC’s action if more than three-
fourths of the survey respondents correctly predicted
the action.
This procedure resulted in the contingency
table shown in Table 1. The dates for each of these
groups and the corresponding Poole/Rasche and
Kuttner shock measures are presented in Table 2.11
Of the 62 events since March 1994, we conclude
the market fully anticipated 44. For most of these
events the FOMC did not change the funds rate. On
only four occasions when there was no target change
did we conclude the market was surprised. The target
was changed 24 times during this period. We con-
clude market participants were surprised on 14 of
these occasions.
Our classification using the WSJ is generally
supported by the shock measure. There are only two
occasions when the Poole/Rasche shock measure
was larger than 5 basis points when our reading
of the WSJ indicated that the market expected the
FOMC’s action. On both of these occasions, the target
was changed. Moreover, when our reading of the
WSJ indicated that the market was surprised by the
action, the Poole/Rasche shock measure is larger
than 5 basis points on all but three occasions. Market
participants appear to have been surprised by all
four of the intermeeting target changes. Indeed,
three of the four largest shocks by either measure
occurred on these days. This suggests that, while
the market may be able to anticipate the direction
and size of the next target change, predicting the
timing of an action is difficult unless the FOMC fol-
lows a rule, such as only adjusting the funds rate
target at regularly scheduled meetings.
The Results
The variance of the observed change in the 1-
month federal funds futures rate for the 44 events
in the second row of Table 1 is our estimate of σu
2,
the variance of the measurement error. OLS estimates
and estimates obtained using a classic errors-in-
variables estimation technique (EV) are presented in
Tables 3 and 4 for the post-1993 period using the
Poole/Rasche and Kuttner shocks, respectively. Not
surprisingly, the OLS estimates suffer from errors-
in-variables bias. In all cases, EV estimates of β2 are
larger than the corresponding OLS estimates. The
response of these rates to target shocks is larger with
the Poole/Rasche measure than with the Kuttner
measure, but the differences are generally small.
Figure 1, which shows the two measures of target
shocks, reveals that there is close correspondence
between these measures.12 Hence, it is hardly sur-
prising that these measures yield very similar results.
As a result, only the Poole/Rasche shock will be
presented in the remainder of the paper.
Do Markets Respond to Expected
Target Changes?
One unexpected result is the finding that the
3-month rate responds significantly to actual target
changes, suggesting that the market responds to
expected changes. The estimated coefficient on the
target change in the regression for the 3-month rate
is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This
result is at odds with the efficient markets hypothesis
and with Poole/Rasche and Kuttner, who found
that markets did not respond to anticipated target
changes. It is also at odds with our findings (pre-
sented in the next section) for the pre-1994 period.
Kuttner (2001) reports a similar result when he
used monthly average data. Specifically, he found
that both the 3- and 6-month T-bill rates responded
significantly to his measure of the surprise target
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11 As Kuttner (2001) has noted, the change on October 15, 1998, was
announced at 3:15 p.m. Eastern time, after the markets closed. Conse-
quently, for the purpose of the empirical analysis, this change is dated
as October 16.
12 The simple correlation between these measures is 0.98.
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Contingency Table of Anticipated and
Unanticipated Events Obtained from the
Wall Street Journal
No target  Target 
change change Total
Surprise 4 14 18
No surprise 34 10 44
Total 38 24 62
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Dates and Poole/Rasche and Kuttner Shock
Measures Corresponding to Table 1
Figure reference 
Date Poole/Rasche Kuttner number
Surprise/no target change
9/27/94 –0.08 –0.20 Figure 7
12/20/94 –0.11 –0.17 Figure A1-A
9/24/96 –0.13 –0.12 Figure 6
5/20/97 –0.09 –0.11 Figure A1-B
Surprise/target change
3/22/94 –0.04 –0.03 Figure 4
4/18/94* 0.10 0.10 Figure 2
5/17/94 0.05 0.13 Figure 3
8/16/94 0.10 0.14 Figure A2-A
11/15/94 0.09 0.14 Figure A2-B
7/06/95 –0.07 –0.01 Figure A2-C
12/19/95 –0.11 –0.10 Figure A2-D
1/31/96 –0.07 –0.07 Figure A2-E
10/16/98* –0.20 –0.26 Figure A2-F
11/17/98 –0.06 –0.06 Figure A2-G
11/16/99 0.08 0.09 Figure A2-H
1/03/01* –0.29 –0.38 Figure A2-I
3/20/01 0.03 0.06 Figure 5
4/18/01* –0.42 –0.43 Figure A2-J
No surprise/no target change
7/06/94 –0.02 –0.05 NA
3/28/95 0.00 0.10 NA
5/23/95 0.01 0.00 NA
8/22/95 0.02 0.00 NA
9/26/95 0.04 0.00 NA
11/15/95 0.01 0.06 NA
3/26/96 0.01 –0.03 NA
5/21/96 0.01 0.00 NA
7/03/96 –0.05 –0.05 NA
8/20/96 –0.01 –0.04 NA
11/13/96 0.01 0.00 NA
12/17/96 0.00 0.10 NA
Table 2
Figure reference 
Date Poole/Rasche Kuttner number
No surprise/no target change cont’d
2/05/97 –0.02 –0.03 NA
7/02/97 –0.01 –0.02 NA
8/19/97 0.01 –0.01 NA
9/30/97 0.00 0.00 NA
11/12/97 –0.02 –0.04 NA
12/16/97 –0.01 –0.01 NA
2/04/98 0.01 0.00 NA
3/31/98 0.00 0.00 NA
5/19/98 –0.02 –0.03 NA
7/01/98 –0.01 –0.01 NA
8/19/98 0.00 0.00 NA
12/22/98 0.00 0.00 NA
2/03/99 –0.01 0.00 NA
3/30/99 0.00 0.00 NA
5/18/99 –0.01 –0.02 NA
10/05/99 0.00 –0.04 NA
12/21/99 0.00 0.03 NA
6/28/00 –0.02 –0.02 NA
8/22/00 0.00 0.00 NA
10/03/00 0.00 0.00 NA
11/15/00 0.00 0.00 NA
12/19/00 0.05 0.05 NA
No surprise/target change
2/01/95 0.02 0.05 Figure A3-A
3/25/97 0.04 0.03 Figure A3-B
9/29/98 0.06 0.06 Figure A3-C
6/30/99 –0.04 –0.04 Figure 9
8/24/99 0.03 0.02 Figure 10
2/02/00 –0.04 –0.05 Figure A3-D
3/21/00 –0.01 –0.03 Figure 8
5/16/00 0.04 0.05 Figure  A3-E
1/31/01 0.00 0.00 Figure A3-F
5/15/01 –0.07 –0.08 Figure A3-G
NOTE: *Indicates an intermeeting target change.change when monthly data were used. He interprets
this result as being consistent with the expectations
theory of the term structure, suggesting that “the
anticipated rate changes are associated with expec-
tations of further actions in subsequent months.”13
While market participants may revise their expec-
tation of future rate changes in response to an un-
anticipated target change, we do not believe that
they would do so in response to an expected target
change. Consequently, we suspect there is another
explanation for this result.
One possible explanation comes from noting
that before 1994 there were relatively few occasions
when the funds rate target and the discount rate
were changed simultaneously. After 1994 things are
very different. Of the 24 target changes considered
in the post-1993 period, 16 were accompanied by
a change in the discount rate. Thornton (1996)
found that the 3-month T-bill rate responded differ-
ently to target changes when the discount rate was
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OLS and EV Estimates of the Response of Treasury Rates to Target Surprises Using the
Poole/Rasche Measure (Post-1993)
OLS EV
Rate αβ 1 β2 R
– 2/se αβ 1 β2 R
– 2/se
∆tb3 –0.112 (0.01) 0.083 (0.03) 0.757 (0.24) 0.600/0.086 –0.122 (0.01) 0.071 (0.03) 0.808 (0.28) 0.597/0.086
∆tb6 –0.035 (0.01) 0.056 (0.03) 0.586 (0.18) 0.531/0.074 –0.035 (0.01) 0.045 (0.04) 0.635 (0.20) 0.528/0.074
∆tb12 –0.035 (0.01) 0.034 (0.03) 0.502 (0.17) 0.384/0.080 –0.035 (0.01) 0.024 (0.03) 0.546 (0.19) 0.381/0.080
∆T2yr –0.027 (0.02) 0.023 (0.04) 0.334 (0.18) 0.115/0.096 –0.027 (0.02) 0.015 (0.04) 0.364 (0.20) 0.114/0.096
∆T5yr –0.029 (0.02) –0.023 (0.04) 0.159 (0.22) 0.000/0.106 –0.028 (0.02) –0.028 (0.04) 0.182 (0.23) 0.000/0.106
∆T10yr 0.025 (0.02) –0.049 (0.04) 0.014 (0.21) 0.000/0.098 –0.024 (0.02) –0.052 (0.04) 0.027 (0.22) 0.000/0.098
∆T30yr –0.029 (0.01) –0.048 (0.03) –0.083 (0.13) 0.003/0.073 –0.029 (0.01) –0.050 (0.04) –0.075 (0.13) 0.003/0.073
NOTE: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.
∆∆ ∆ if f f f tt t
u
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Table 3
OLS and EV Estimates of the Response of Treasury Rates to Target Surprises Using the Kuttner
Measure (Post-1993)
OLS EV
Rate αβ 1 β2 R
– 2/se αβ 1 β2 R
– 2/se
∆tb3 –0.017 (0.01) 0.077 (0.03) 0.662 (0.20) 0.607/0.085 –0.018 (0.01) 0.065 (0.04) 0.706 (0.23) 0.604/0.085
∆tb6 –0.040 (0.01) 0.059 (0.04) 0.489 (0.15) 0.506/0.076 –0.040 (0.01) 0.048 (0.04) 0.528 (0.17) 0.502/0.076
∆tb12 –0.041 (0.01) 0.044 (0.03) 0.392 (0.16) 0.332/0.083 –0.041 (0.02) 0.034 (0.04) 0.426 (0.17) 0.329/0.084
∆T2yr –0.034 (0.02) 0.046 (0.04) 0.204 (0.17) 0.053/0.010 –0.034 (0.02) 0.041 (0.05) 0.224 (0.19) 0.052/0.100
∆T5yr –0.035 (0.02) 0.008 (0.04) 0.027 (0.21) 0.000/0.108 –0.035 (0.02) 0.005 (0.04) 0.038 (0.23) 0.000/0.108
∆T10yr –0.029 (0.02) –0.021 (0.04) –0.087 (0.20) 0.000/0.097 –0.029 (0.02) –0.022 (0.04) –0.083 (0.21) 0.000/0.097
∆T30yr –0.032 (0.01) –0.028 (0.03) –0.142 (0.11) 0.035/0.072 –0.031 (0.01) –0.029 (0.03) –0.141 (0.12) 0.035/0.072
NOTE: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.
∆∆ ∆ if f f f tt t
u
t =+ + − + αβ β β ε 12 1
** ()
Table 4
13 Kuttner (2001, p. 541).changed. Discount rate changes appear to have an
independent effect on market rates. Hence, it is
possible that the significant response to expected
target changes (reported in Tables 3 and 4) is due to
the fact that, on some occasions, the Fed provided
additional information by simultaneously changing
the discount rate.
To investigate this possibility, the equations were
reestimated with target changes partitioned into
those when the discount rate was changed and
those when it was not. Specifically, the equation
(11)
was estimated.
EV estimates of equation (11) are reported in
Table 5. They suggest that changes in the funds
rate target that are accompanied by changes in the
discount rate provide additional (unanticipated)
information. In the absence of such additional
information, the market does not respond signifi-
cantly to expected target changes. The market only
responds to “expected” target changes when new
information is simultaneously provided. In this case,
∆∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ if f d r f f n o d r f f tt t t
u
t =+ + ′ ++ αβ β β ε 11 3
** * ||
the new information comes in the form of a discount
rate change.
THE MARKET REACTION TO 
UNEXPECTED TARGET CHANGES—
PRE-1994
To apply the Poole/Rasche and Kuttner method-
ology to target changes before 1994, we must first
identify whether the market realized on the day of
the event that a target change had occurred. To deter-
mine the market’s knowledge of a target change, we
read the front page and the Credit Markets column
from the WSJ for at least two days after each change
in the funds rate target. This procedure is compli-
cated by the fact that there is some difference of opin-
ion about when the funds rate target was changed.
We started with a widely used series of target changes
reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Recently, however, Thornton and Wheelock (2000)
presented an alternative series prepared by the staff
of the FOMC Secretariat’s office. Before 1989 these
series sometimes differ in the dating and magnitude
of Fed actions. The dates considered are the union
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Poole/Rasche and Kuttner Measures of Unexpected Funds Rate Target Changes
(Post-1993)
Poole/Rasche Measure
NOTE:     Denotes unexpected target changes associated with intermeeting changes in the funds rate target.
Figure 1of the two data sets. As a further check on the dating
of the target change, we consulted the Report of Open
Market Operations and Money Market Conditions
(hereafter ROMO), which is prepared biweekly by the
Manager of the Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (the Desk). A detailed analysis of
these differences led us to use the Secretariat’s date
of July 6, 1989, rather than the New York Fed’s date
of July 7. The boxed insert provides a discussion of
the more interesting dating conflicts, including the
July 1989 conflict.
The market began to focus more attention on
interest rates, including the federal funds rate, in
1987. Earlier in the decade of the 1980s, much of
the discussion of policy was in terms of the effect
of policy actions on the rate of money growth. Aware
that Fed actions to increase or decrease reserve pres-
sure influenced the federal funds rate, the market
increasingly gauged policy by movements in the
funds rate. However, market analysts frequently
were unable to determine whether changes in the
funds rate signaled a monetary policy action. In
the early part of 1988, it appears that the market
became more aware that the Fed was relying heavily
on the funds rate to implement policy and market
analysts began to surmise the Fed’s intentions for
the funds rate by observing Desk operations relative
to the behavior of the funds rate.
Table 6 reports the amounts and dates of all
funds rate target changes and the new effective target
level reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York between August 1987 and December 1993.14
If there is a difference between the New York series
and the Secretariat’s series, the Secretariat’s dating
of the action is also indicated. The table also indicates
whether the discount rate was changed. Under
Chairman Greenspan the funds rate target was
changed whenever the discount rate was changed.
This was not the case previously; more often than
not the discount rate and the funds rate target were
changed on different days.
Despite the increased awareness that the Fed
was paying attention to the funds rate in conducting
monetary policy, there is little indication that the
market was aware that the Fed was setting an explicit
objective for the federal funds rate before 1989. We
believe that the first time in the 1980s that market
participants knew that policy action occurred was
May 9, 1988, when the Desk injected fewer reserves
than analysts expected. This action sparked specu-
lation that the Fed was increasing its fight against
inflation, and market analysts concluded that the
action would cause the funds rate to trade at 7 per-
cent or slightly higher.15
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EV Estimates with Target Changes Partitioned into Those That Were and Were Not Accompanied
by a Change in the Discount Rate
Rate αβ 1 β′
1 β3 R
– 2/se
∆tb3 –0.122 (0.11) 0.071 (0.03) 0.075 (0.06) 0.738 (0.30) 0.577/0.088
∆tb6 –0.035 (0.01) 0.033 (0.04) 0.098 (0.08) 0.605 (0.23) 0.509/0.076
∆tb12 –0.036 (0.01) 0.005 (0.05) 0.112 (0.08) 0.546 (0.21) 0.370/0.081
∆T2yr –0.029 (0.02) –0.016 (0.05) 0.161 (0.13) 0.388 (0.22) 0.127/0.096
∆T5yr –0.030 (0.02) –0.064 (0.05) 0.142 (0.14) 0.256 (0.25) 0.000/0.105
∆T10yr –0.026 (0.02) –0.083 (0.05) 0.093 (0.11) 0.118 (0.24) 0.000/0.097
∆T30yr –0.030 (0.01) –0.072 (0.04) 0.055 (0.10) 0.002 (0.10) 0.014/0.107
NOTE: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.
∆∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ if f d r f f n o d r f f tt t t
u
t =+ + ′ ++ αβ β β ε 11 3
** * ||
Table 5
14 As Kuttner (2001) has noted, the target change that occurred at the
December 1990 FOMC meeting was effectively revealed to the market
with the announcement of a 50-basis-point cut of the discount rate on
December 18. The announcement was made at 3:30 p.m., however,
after the markets had closed. Consequently, this change is dated as
December 19. It should also be noted that there are two dates in Table
6 that differ from those reported in Thornton and Wheelock (2000,
Appendix B). The first is October 16, 1989; Thornton and Wheelock
originally used October 18. The second is January 9, 1991, originally
dated January 8.
15 This is also one of the dates where there is discrepancy on exactly
when the change was implemented. The Secretariat’s series suggests
that the change took place on May 7. There is no indication that the
market was aware of an action on that date, however.The market was not consistently aware of target
changes at the time they happened until late 1989.
This is about the time that the Fed began the practice
of making target changes in multiples of 25 basis
points. After late 1989 market analysts appear to
have become adroit at identifying target changes
when they occurred. In most cases analysts deter-
mined that the target had changed based on signals
from the Desk. In many cases, however, the precise
nature of the signal was not specified.
Did Market Analysts Anticipate Fed
Actions?
In order to make the EV adjustment, we must
again identify days on which the market was affected
only by ambient news. Hence, the relevant question
is, did market analysts anticipate Fed actions? The
answer is yes, and no. There were many occasions
when actions to increase or decrease pressure in
the reserve market came as no surprise. Information
on the state of the economy, inflation, or movements
in the short-term interest rate fueled speculation
that the Fed would soon change the discount rate
or take other actions to alter the availability of
credit. In this sense, there appears to be relatively
few cases where the market was completely sur-
prised by an action.
On the other hand, the precise dating of the Fed
action nearly always surprised the market. Unlike
the post-1993 period, we could find few instances
where there was a widespread expectation that the
Fed would take an action on a particular day. More-
over, we found no instance where there was a wide-
spread expectation that the Fed would take an
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CONFLICT IN THE DATING OF
TARGET CHANGES
There are a few cases, deserving of special
attention, where there is conflict in the dating of
the change in the federal funds rate target as
reported by the New York Fed compared with the
dating provided by the staff of the Secretariat. The
first occurred in January 1989. The New York Fed
suggests the funds rate target was increased by
25 basis points on January 5, 1989. The staff of
the Secretariat is less precise, putting the change
early in January. From our reading of the WSJ, it
is apparent that the market was aware that the Fed
changed policy before January 5; however, the
precise date cannot be determined. On January 5
the WSJ merely indicates that analysts thought
that the Fed had tightened credit earlier in the
week. The Report of Open Market Operations
and Money Market Conditions (hereafter, ROMO),
however, clearly indicates that “on the second
Thursday—January 5—the borrowing allowance
was increased to $600 million, in line with the
Committee’s decision at the December meeting.”
Hence, while the market thought that the Desk
took actions consistent with changing policy in
the first few days of January, the Desk indicates
that the action was not taken until January 5.
The second case occurred in July 1989. The
New York Fed dates the change on July 7, the
Secretariat on July 6. Market analysts agree with
the Secretariat staff’s dating of the action and
thought the Fed moved on the 6th, when the
funds rate traded significantly below its previous
trading range of 9.5 percent and the Desk made
no attempt to offset the rate move. The ROMO
indicates that “after the Committee’s July 5-6
meeting, the borrowing allowance was set at
$600 million. This adjustment represented a
slight intended easing of pressures on reserve
positions, while also recognizing the recent rise
in seasonal borrowing. (In the FOMC’s discus-
sion, ‘unchanged’ conditions of reserve availabil-
ity were associated with a borrowing level of
$650 million; at any event, the Desk continued
to view the borrowing allowance with some
flexibility.)” The July 5-6 FOMC meeting
adjourned at 11:50 a.m. Eastern time on July 6.
Hence, it is very unlikely the Desk implemented
the FOMC’s decision on the 6th. Because of this,
the New York Fed dates the change on July 7, but
because the decision was made on July 6, the
staff of the Secretariat dates the change on the
6th. Nevertheless, the market interpreted the
Desk’s failure to act on July 6, when the funds
rate traded significantly below the previous trading
level, as a policy action. While the decision is
somewhat arbitrary, we have decided to use the
Secretariat’s dating of this target change.
The third case occurred in October 1989. The
New York Fed dates the change on October 16 and
the staff of the Secretariat dates it on October 19.
Market analysts thought that the Fed had taken a
(Continued on p. 75)action on the day the funds rate target was actually
changed. Hence, in this respect, all target changes
before 1994 were unexpected. Because the market
frequently saw the need for an action, not all “unex-
pected” target changes resulted in large adjustments
to federal funds futures rates.
We were unable to identify any occasion when
the market correctly anticipated the Fed’s action
on a particular day, other than at scheduled FOMC
meetings. Consequently, we determined the variance
of the ambient news, σu
2, by using days when there
was no headline announcement, no FOMC meeting,
and no change in either the funds rate target or the
discount rate.
The OLS and EV estimates for the pre-1994
period are presented in Table 7. The response of
Treasury rates for the pre-1994 period is somewhat
larger than for the post-1993 period, especially at
the longer end of the term structure. Moreover, the
R –2s indicate that a much larger proportion of the
variance in Treasury rates on days when the market
knew that the Fed changed the funds rate target is
explained by unexpected target changes. This is
particularly true at the very long end of the term
structure where all rates respond significantly to
unexpected target changes. Furthermore, as the
efficient market hypothesis suggests, none of the
rates responds significantly to anticipated target
changes.
INTERPRETING THE RESPONSE OF
TREASURY RATES
Interpreting the response of Treasury rates to
unexpected changes in the funds rate target requires
an economic structure. While the simple expecta-
tions hypothesis (EH) of the term structure of interest
rates is nearly always rejected, longer-term instru-
ments are clearly forward looking.16 Consequently,
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policy action on October 16, when the Desk did
not attempt to offset a significant decline in the
federal funds rate. Indeed, fff
1declined by 16 basis
points on October 16, suggesting that a very signifi-
cant revision in the market’s expectation for the
federal funds rate occurred on that day. Market
analysts also thought that the Fed took an action
on the 19th, when the Desk added reserves despite
the fact that the funds rate had drifted below the
previous trading level.
The ROMO points to the source of the confu-
sion. The ROMO for the maintenance period end-
ing October 19, 1989, indicates that
The financial markets were jittery after
the second weekend, in the wake of the
190-point plunge in the Dow Jones
Industrial Average in late afternoon trading
on October 13. New reports over the week-
end had cited a “Fed official” as saying
that the System would assure the provi-
sion of adequate liquidity. As a result, mar-
ket participants widely expected a reserve
injection on Monday and these anticipa-
tions appeared to exert additional down-
ward pressure on the funds rate. The Desk
responded to the unsettled conditions in
financial markets by executing customer-
related repurchase agreements on the
second Monday and Tuesday [October
16 & 17]. A final round of customer RPs
was arranged on the settlement date
[October 18], against the background of
a bit firmer Federal funds rate that morn-
ing—83/4 percent—which appeared to
stem partly from market uncertainties in
the wake of Tuesday night’s earthquake
in San Francisco. Also, a background
factor by this point was the decision dis-
cussed at Wednesday’s FOMC conference
call to begin implementing a slightly
more accommodative reserve posture in
light of recently incoming economic
information: it was now expected that
Fed funds trading would tend to center
around 83/4 percent.
The New York Fed and the staff of the
Secretariat are obviously disputing the dating
of the same policy action that could not have
occurred on the same day. The discussion in
the ROMO gives rather weak support to the
Secretariat’s dating, but the Desk’s action of
injecting reserves on October 16 when the funds
rate was declining suggests that the Desk was pur-
suing a lower funds rate on Monday. Consequently,
we use the New York Fed’s dating of this action.
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Knowledge of Fed Actions Obtained from Reading the Credit Markets Column of the 
Wall Street Journal
Poole/Rasche 
Date ff * ∆ff * Secretariat shock Knowledge
8/27/87 6.7500 0.1250 NA No
9/03/87 6.8750 0.1250 NA No
9/04/87† 7.2500 0.3750 NA No
9/22/87 0.1250 NA No
9/24/87 7.3125 0.0625 NA No
10/22/87 7.1250 –0.1875 NA No
10/23/87 –0.3750 NA No
10/28/87 7.0000 –0.1250 NA No
11/04/87 6.8125 –0.1875 NA No
1/28/88 6.6250 –0.1875 NA No
2/10/88 –0.1250 NA No
2/11/88 6.5000 –0.1250 NA No
3/29/88 0.2500 NA No
3/30/88 6.7500 0.2500 NA No
5/07/88 0.2500 NA No
5/09/88 7.0000 0.2500 NA Yes
5/25/88 7.2500 0.2500 NA No
6/22/88 7.5000 0.2500 NA No
7/19/88 7.6875 0.1875 NA No
8/08/88 7.7500 0.0625 NA No
8/09/88† 8.1250 0.3750 NA Yes
10/20/88 8.2500 0.1250 0.00 No
11/17/88 8.3125 0.0625 0.07 No
11/22/88 8.3750 0.0625 0.07 No
12/14/88 0.4000 0.02 No
12/15/88 8.6875 0.3125 0.05 Yes
12/29/88 8.7500 0.0625 –0.06 No
Early 1/89 0.3125 NA Yes
1/05/89 9.0000 0.2500 0.00 No
2/09/89 9.0625 0.0625 0.01 No
2/14/89 9.3125 0.2500 0.04 Yes
2/23/89 9.5625 0.2500 0.14 Yes
2/24/89† 9.7500 0.1875 0.14 Yes
5/04/89 9.8125 0.0625 0.02 No
6/06/89 9.5625 –0.2500 0.01 Yes
7/06/89 –0.2500 0.03 Yes
7/07/89 9.3125 –0.2500 –0.05 No
7/27/89 9.0625 –0.2500 –0.06 No
8/10/89 9.0000 –0.0625 0.02 No
Table 6it is reasonable to assume that the long-term rate is
determined, at least in part, by the market’s expec-
tation of the funds rate target. The simple EH hypoth-
esizes that the long-term rate is equal to the market’s
expectation for the overnight federal funds rate over
the holding period of the long-term rate plus a con-
stant risk premium, π, i.e.,
(12) ,
where it
n denotes the n-day maturity Treasury rate
on day t and π
n denotes a maturity-specific constant
risk premium. It is perhaps more reasonable to
assume that there is a time-varying component to
in E f f t
n
tt i i
n n = ∑ + + =
− () 1 0
1 / π
the risk premium, so that the EH can be more gen-
erally written as
(13) ,
where ωt denotes the unobserved time-varying
component of the risk premium and vt
n denotes a
random idiosyncratic shock to the n-day maturity
Treasury rate.




To see how our results can be interpreted, we
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Knowledge of Fed Actions Obtained from Reading the Credit Markets Column of the 
Wall Street Journal
Poole/Rasche 
Date ff * ∆ff * Secretariat shock Knowledge
10/16/89 8.7500 –0.2500 –0.16 Yes
10/19/89 –0.2500 0.00 Yes
11/06/89 8.5000 –0.2500 0.03 No
12/19/89 –0.2500 0.00‡ No
12/20/89 8.2500 –0.2500 –0.17‡ Yes
7/13/90 8.0000 –0.2500 –0.09 Yes
10/29/90 7.7500 –0.2500 –0.02 Yes
11/14/90 7.5000 –0.2500 0.02 No
12/07/90 7.2500 –0.2500 –0.14 Yes
12/19/90† 7.0000 –0.2500 –0.16 Yes
1/08/91 6.7500 –0.2500 –0.10 Yes
2/01/91† 6.2500 –0.5000 –0.20 Yes
3/08/91 6.0000 –0.2500 –0.13 Yes
4/30/91† 5.7500 –0.2500 –0.17 Yes
8/06/91 5.5000 –0.2500 –0.09 Yes
9/13/91† 5.2500 –0.2500 –0.04 Yes
10/31/91 5.0000 –0.2500 –0.05 No
11/06/91† 4.7500 –0.2500 –0.12 Yes
12/06/91 4.5000 –0.2500 –0.11 Yes
12/20/91† 4.0000 –0.5000 –0.26 Yes
4/09/92 3.7500 –0.2500 –0.21 Yes
7/02/92† 3.2500 –0.5000 –0.32 Yes
9/04/92 3.0000 –0.2500 –0.20 Yes
NOTE: †Indicates the target change was accompanied by a change in the discount rate.
‡The Poole/Rasche measure is unavailable on these days, so the Kuttner measure is reported.
Table 6 cont’dimpose the restriction that the market only responds
to unexpected target changes so that equation (6)
can be rewritten as
(15) .




The problem is that fft*u is unobservable. To
see the potential problems associated with using
the federal funds futures rate, assume that the h-
month-ahead federal funds futures rate is equal to
the market’s expectation for the average effective
federal funds rate h months into the future, adjusted




h denotes the potential constant and
time-varying components of a term premium for
the h-month-ahead federal funds futures rate, ffk
h
denotes the effective federal funds rate on day k
of month h in the future, and ηt
h denotes an idiosyn-
cratic shock to the h-month federal funds futures
rate. Taking the first difference of (17) yields
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Assuming that the target change (γ) is expected
to be constant over the next month and that Et ffk
1=
Et ffk
*, the Poole/Rasche measure of the unexpected
target change is ∆ffft
1=γ+∆θt
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Assume that (i) the idiosyncratic shocks are
independent of each other and of the time-varying
term premiums, (ii) ρ ˆis an estimate of the coefficient
of the correlation between the change in the time-





∆θ are estimates of the variance of the
time-varying components for the Treasury and fed-
eral funds futures rates, respectively. If participants
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OLS and EV Estimates of the Response of Treasury Rates to Target Surprises Using the
Poole/Rasche Measure (Pre-1994)
OLS EV
Rate αβ 1 β2 R
– 2/se αβ 1 β2 R
– 2/se
∆tb3 –0.017 (0.01) 0.067 (0.06) 0.774 (0.09) 0.844/0.042 –0.017 (0.01) 0.027 (0.07) 0.823 (0.10) 0.840/0.042
∆tb6 –0.023 (0.02) –0.012 (0.11) 0.840 (0.09) 0.816/0.047 –0.023 (0.01) –0.059 (0.12) 0.899 (0.11) 0.811/0.048
∆tb12 –0.006 (0.01) 0.014 (0.05) 0.860 (0.09) 0.861/0.042 –0.006 (0.01) –0.032 (0.06) 0.918 (0.10) 0.856/0.042
∆T2yr 0.002 (0.01) 0.040 (0.08) 0.715 (0.12) 0.545/0.078 0.003 (0.01) 0.003 (0.09) 0.761 (0.14) 0.543/0.078
∆T5yr 0.002 (0.01) 0.021 (0.08) 0.534 (0.13) 0.413/0.073 0.002 (0.01) –0.007 (0.09) 0.569 (0.14) 0.411/0.074
∆T10yr 0.010 (0.01) 0.008 (0.07) 0.399 (0.10) 0.304/0.067 0.011 (0.01) –0.014 (0.07) 0.426 (0.11) 0.302/0.067
∆T30yr 0.008 (0.01) 0.062 (0.07) 0.264 (0.09) 0.187/0.072 0.008 (0.01) 0.051 (0.07) 0.277 (0.10) 0.186/0.065
NOTE: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.
∆∆ ∆ if f f f tt t
u
t =+ + − + αβ β β ε 12 1
** ()
Table 7If there are neither time-varying risk premiums nor
idiosyncratic shocks to the federal funds futures
rate, β ˆ
2=1. To the extent that we have corrected
for the bias due to common shocks, the estimate of
β ˆ
2 should be close to 1 if the market participants
permanently revise their expectation for the funds
rate target point-for-point with the unexpected
target change and if the idiosyncratic variation in
the 1-month futures rate is relatively small.
Estimates of β ˆ
2 will be less than 1 if the market
believes that the change in the target will last for a
period that is shorter than the maturity of the instru-
ment. Note that the estimate of β ˆ
2 could also be
greater than 1. This could occur if market partici-
pants believe that the unexpected target change
will lead to further changes in the same direction.18
If the market correctly anticipates the magnitude
of the Fed’s action but misses the timing, the size
of the response will depend on the extent to which
the market missed the timing—the larger the miss,
the larger the response.
The estimates of β2 in Tables 3 and 7 for the
post-1993 and pre-1994 periods suggest that
Treasury rates respond significantly to unexpected
changes in the Fed’s funds rate target. For both the
3- and 6-month T-bill rates the estimated coefficient
is not significantly different from 1, suggesting that
the market revises its expectation for the funds rate
target several months into the future point-for-point
with the unexpected change in the target. During
the pre-1994 period, the estimated coefficients on
the 12-month and 2-year rates are also not signifi-
cantly different from 1, suggesting that the market
revised its expectation for the funds rate target over
a longer horizon before 1994. In most of these
instances, however, the point estimates are quite
different from 1. It is impossible to say whether this
is due to missing the timing of the Fed’s action or
to the relative importance of idiosyncratic variation
in the futures rate. 
For both periods, the response of the Treasury
rate to unexpected target changes declines as the
term lengthens. For the post-1993 period, the










































maturities beyond 12 months. Indeed, for the 10-
and 30-year rates the point estimates are essen-
tially zero. In contrast, for the pre-1994 period the
response is statistically significant for all maturities.
One possible interpretation for the general
result that the response declines as the maturity
lengthens is that the market believes that the funds
rate will stay at its new level for a relatively short
period of time. For the pre-1994 period, the response
is nearly the same for maturities up to 12 months
and then declines. Kuttner (2001) and Cook and
Hahn (1989) interpret this result to “mean reversion”
of the federal funds rate. Specifically, they suggest
that beyond one year, the market expects the funds
rate to revert to its mean level. The cycles in the
nominal federal funds rate are very long, however.
It seems unlikely that the market would anticipate
that the funds rate would start to return to its mean
level in just over a year. Moreover, for the post-1993
period, the estimated coefficients begin to decline
after three months. For this explanation to account
for the post-1993 results, the market would have to
anticipate mean reversion after three months—an
incredibly short period.
CASE STUDIES
A potential problem in interpreting the estimate
of β2 arises from the fact that all interest rates are
affected by publicly available information. Case
studies can shed light on this and several other issues.
To illustrate the potential problem, note that
(15) is actually
(21) .
Now assume that equation (21) is mistakenly esti-
mated using days when there were no unexpected
changes in the funds rate target, i.e.,
(22) .
Substituting (14) and (18) into (22), it is easy to show
that the OLS estimate of β is equal to
(23) .
Estimates of β will be zero if and only if ρ ˆ=0. If the
term premiums are positively correlated, the esti-
mate of βwill be larger the larger is ρ ˆand the smaller
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(20)futures rate. If the magnitude of ρ ˆ declines as the
term to maturity on Treasury rates lengthens, so
too will estimates of β.
Identifying times where there were unexpected
changes in the funds rate target is critical for inter-
preting the results, because of the potential for cor-
relation between changes in Treasury rates and
changes in the federal funds futures rate even when
there are no changes in the funds rate target or
expectations thereof. We have been careful; never-
theless, it is important to check the robustness of
our interpretation of the results. As a check on our
interpretation, we undertook a case-by-case inves-
tigation of the response of federal funds futures
rates to each unexpected target change noted in
Table 2. In each instance, we examined the rates on
federal funds futures contracts for the month of
the event and for the months leading up to and just
after the surprise events identified in Table 2.
Before discussing the findings in general, it is
useful to get an idea of the methodology with two
illustrative examples (a detailed analysis of each
of the surprise events is presented in the appendix).
The first example is for the intermeeting target
change that occurred on April 18, 1994. The com-
mentary indicated that the market anticipated that
the Fed would raise the funds rate, but the timing
of the April move was unexpected. For the period
leading up to and just after the April 18, 1994,
increase in the funds rate target, Figure 2 shows
the rates on the April, May, and June federal funds
futures contracts, the funds rate target, and the
average funds rate target for April. The average target
is the weighted average of the target of 3.5 percent
for 18 days and 3.75 percent for 12 days.
During March (at least as early as the release
of the report on the employment situation for
February 1994 on March 4), the prevailing expecta-
tion was as follows: there was a high probability of
a 50-basis-point increase before the beginning of
May, with an even higher intended funds rate on
average during June. The increase in the funds rate
target that occurred in March was expected and
there was no revision of the market’s expectation
for the future funds rate target.
The situation after the April intermeeting move
is very different. Figure 3 shows that there was a
significant revision in the market’s expectation for
the funds rate in May and June immediately upon
the Fed’s April action. For most of the period subse-
quent to the intermeeting change in the intended
funds rate in April, market participants assigned a
high probability to an additional increase of 50 basis
points at the May FOMC meeting. Market participants
had come to expect that a 50-basis-point increase
over the target established in April would prevail
during May and were assigning a high probability
of an additional 25-basis-point increase at the June
FOMC meeting. In late March, expectations of even
higher intended funds rates for April, May, and June
prevailed; however, these expectations were reversed
by early April. Consistent with our interpretation
of the regression results, the April action appears
to have caused market participants to significantly
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Figure 3revise their expectations for the funds rate in May
and June.
For 9 of the 14 target changes where our analysis
of market commentary suggested that the market
was surprised by the Fed’s action, there was a clear
indication that the market revised its expectation
for the funds rate out two months. On one of these
occasions (July 6, 1995), however, the market’s
expectation for the funds rate out two months was
significantly revised in the weeks following the
target change.
There appeared to be no significant revision of
the market’s expectation for the funds rate out two
months on five occasions. One of these occasions
occurred on March 22, 1994, shown in Figure 4. The
market had revised its expectation for the funds
rate in May, a couple of weeks prior to the March
FOMC meeting. While our analysis of the commen-
tary suggested that the March action was a surprise,
both the Poole/Rasche and Kuttner measures of the
unexpected target change were very small. Hence,
it may be that the commentary did not reflect the
true market expectations at the time of the action.
Another instance when there was no revision
of the market’s expectation occurred on March 20,
2001, shown in Figure 5. At the time the FOMC
reduced the funds rate target by 50 basis points,
market participants were anticipating a 75-basis-
point reduction; however, there was no immediate
revision of the market’s expectation following the
announcement.
On three of the five occasions, the Poole/Rasche
measure of the unexpected target change was 6
basis points or less—about two standard deviations
of the variation in this measure associated with
ambient news, suggesting that these actions were
perhaps less of a surprise than the market commen-
tary suggested. Moreover, on all occasions when
the Poole/Rasche measure was larger than 10 basis
points, the market appeared to revise its expectation
for the funds rate at least two months out, suggest-
ing that market participants might not revise their
longer-run outlook for the funds rate target except
in cases where they make a relatively large error in
forecasting the Fed’s action.
Market participants should not only revise their
expectations when there is a surprise change in
the funds rate, but also when they are surprised
that the target was not changed. We identified only
four such events. Our analysis suggests that of these
four cases, three were instances when market partici-
pants revised their expectations for the future federal
funds rate when the Fed failed to act as expected.
The most dramatic of these occurred in
September 1996. The commentary indicated that
market participants expected an FOMC action.
Figure 6 shows the rates on the September, October,
and November futures rate contracts before and
after the September 1996 meeting. Both the futures
rates and the market commentary suggest that mar-
ket participants were expecting the FOMC to raise
the target at the September FOMC meeting and were
expecting additional subsequent increases. When
the FOMC unexpectedly left the target unchanged,
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Figure 5market participants significantly revised down
their expectations for the funds rate in October and
November. In the three cases where the Fed’s inaction
prompted markets to revise their longer-term expec-
tations for the funds rate, the revision in expectations
appears to be large relative to those cases where
the FOMC took a surprise action. This finding is
consistent with our previous interpretation in that,
if the market expects a 25-basis-point change in the
target and the FOMC does nothing, the unexpected
action is relatively large.
The exception occurred in September 1994,
shown in Figure 7, when the surprise decision not to
change the rate at the FOMC meeting of September
27, 1994, had essentially no effect on the market’s
expectation for the federal funds rate in October
and November.
DOES GREATER TANSPARENCY HELP?
The FOMC has made a number of procedural
changes that should have helped the market antici-
pate policy actions. Analysis of the period before the
1994 implementation of the practice of announcing
target changes is hampered by the fact that most
target changes were made during the intermeeting
period. Because the market could never be sure
when a change was most likely to occur, market
commentary never predicted the date or the mag-
nitude of Fed actions before 1994. Hence, market
commentary at that time cannot be used to deter-
mine target changes that were or were not expected,
as was done for the post-1993 period. Table 2, how-
ever, shows that for actions since 1994 that were not
surprise actions, the Poole/Rasche measure of the
unexpected target change was nearly always less
than 6 basis points (about two estimated standard
deviations of the variation in the 1-month futures
rate associated with ambient news). Hence, one way
to determine expected target changes is to assume
that the market anticipated the Fed’s action when
the Poole/Rasche measure of the unexpected target
change is 6 basis points or smaller. Using this crite-
rion, of the 24 target changes before 1994 that the
market was aware had occurred, only 6 were antici-
pated; 18 target changes were unanticipated.
Moreover, if one assumes that changes in the
current or 1-month federal funds futures rate mea-
sures the degree of the unexpected target change,
there were only three instances, on days when the
market knew that the target had been changed,
when there were large unexpected target changes.
All three of these are associated with intermeeting
target changes.
Using the same criterion for the post-1993
period indicates that 10 of the 24 target changes
were unanticipated. Our analysis of market com-
mentary suggested that 14 target changes were
unanticipated, but we concluded that the market
anticipated the FOMC’s action only if market partici-
pants correctly anticipated the size and the timing
of the action.
While the above analysis is simple, it suggests
that the market has been able to better forecast Fed
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Figure 7actions since the 1994 procedural change. In this
regard, more transparency appears to help. This
finding is not too surprising, however, since it is
reasonable to expect that the market does a better
job of anticipating policy actions when the timing
of those actions is somewhat constrained by the
FOMC’s practice. Hence, somewhat more compel-
ling evidence of the value of transparency can be
obtained by determining whether the market is
better able to predict Fed actions further in advance.
How Far in Advance Does the Market
Anticipate Fed Actions?
Our results suggest that after 1994, market
participants usually have anticipated changes in
the funds rate target by the time they have occurred.
The more transparent the Fed is, the further in
advance the market should be able to predict policy
actions. To get an idea of how far in advance the
market anticipates Fed actions, we once again use
the case study approach. Specifically, we plot (i) the
rate on the federal funds futures contract for the
month of target changes that we classified as “no
surprise” in Table 2 and (ii) the average federal funds
rate target for that month. Care must be taken
because of the possibility of changes in the term
premium. Nevertheless, if the market correctly
anticipates the event, the rate on the federal funds
futures contract for the month of the event should
move to the level of the average effective federal
funds rate before the event and stay close to that
rate until the time of the event.
There were ten such events during the post-1993
period. Of these, our analysis suggests that on seven
of these occasions the market anticipated the change
two or more weeks in advance. For the change on
March 21, 2000, shown in Figure 8, market partici-
pants appear to have anticipated the action about
12 weeks in advance. Indeed, before Christmas 1999
market participants correctly anticipated both the
February and March actions.
Two of the more remarkable cases are associated
with the target changes that occurred on June 30
and August 24, 1999. Figures 9 and 10 show the July
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Figure 10and August federal funds futures rates and the aver-
age effective funds rate target for those months,
respectively. By early June the market had come to
expect not only the action taken on June 30, but
the action taken on August 24 as well.
On the remaining three occasions, the actions
appear not to have been expected until just days
prior to the meetings. Hence, while the commenta-
tors were correct that these actions were widely
anticipated, it appears that the market did not figure
out what the FOMC was about to do until just days
before the meeting.
To see whether the market’s ability to predict
Fed actions has improved since the beginning of
1994, we considered the six instances prior to 1994
where the market expected the Fed’s action, using
the criterion that the market expected the action if
the Poole/Rasche measure of the unexpected target
change is 6 basis points or less. Trading in the federal
funds futures contracts began only two months
prior to one of these occasions, December 1988.
Moreover, there was no evidence that the market
was aware that the Fed was targeting the funds rate
at that time. For both of these reasons, analysis of
this event is inappropriate.
Of the remaining five instances, there is only
one instance, July 6, 1989, when the market appears
to have anticipated the Fed’s action well in advance.19
Figure 11 suggests that the 25-basis-point target
change made at that time was anticipated by early
June.
This analysis also supports the conclusion that
transparency is important. After 1994, not only is
the market better able to anticipate when the Fed
will act, but, more importantly, there is some evidence
that the market is able to predict those actions further
in advance. Greater clarity should enable the market
to better predict how the Fed is likely to respond to
incoming information about economic fundamentals.
DISCUSSION
This paper investigates the extent to which
market participants anticipate Fed actions, focusing
on the period since the late 1980s. This period is
nearly ideal. The Fed has been explicitly targeting
the overnight federal funds rate during the entire
period that the federal funds futures rate has been
available to measure the market’s expectation for
the federal funds rate and, consequently, the funds
rate target.
A natural way to proceed in this environment
is to use the change in the futures rate as a proxy
for the unexpected change in the funds rate target
and then estimate the response of longer-term
rates to the unexpected target change. A significant
response of longer-term rates suggests that the
unexpected change in the funds rate target caused
markets to revise their longer-term expectations
for the funds rate. While this procedure can provide
useful information about how market participants
revise their longer-run expectations, we note that
care is required. For one thing, there is a measure-
ment error associated with using the change in the
futures rate to proxy the unexpected target change;
it arises because idiosyncratic and other shocks
cause variation in federal funds futures rates even
when there are no changes in the funds rate target.
This measurement error also can bias down the
estimated response of other rates to the unexpected
target change. In addition, this procedure requires
that market participants know that the Fed has
changed its funds rate target. If market participants
do not know that the target has been changed, the
change in the futures rate does not reflect the un-
expected target change. This problem, of course,
applies to the pre-1994 period when target changes
were not announced.
Accounting for both of these problems, we esti-
mate the response of Treasury rates of various matu-
rities from 3 months to 30 years to unexpected
target changes for periods before and after the
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19 The figures for the other four dates and for December 1988 are pre-
sented in the appendix.FOMC’s 1994 procedural change. We find that the
response of the 3-month T-bill rate is nearly identical
before and after this procedural change. The magni-
tude and significance of the response of longer-term
rates, however, declines after this procedural change.
One possible explanation for the smaller response
of longer-term rates is that the Fed has been more
transparent about its longer-run policy intentions.
Under this interpretation, the market would have
relatively firm expectations that the Fed will change
the funds rate target at some point in the future, but
may have less-firm expectations of exactly when
that change will occur. If only the timing of the target
changes were unexpected, shorter-term futures
rates would respond more to announcements of a
target change than would longer-term rates.
We note that the interpretation of the response
of Treasury rates to unexpected changes in the
funds rate target is complicated by the possibility
that all forward-looking rates might respond to com-
mon information, such as information that alters
the market’s expectation of the term premium. For
this reason, extreme care must be exercised in identi-
fying unexpected changes in the funds rate target.
To address this issue, we undertake a case-by-case
analysis of occasions when market commentary
indicted that the market was surprised by the Fed’s
action or inaction. This analysis suggests that, in
most of those cases, market participants revised
their expectations for the funds rate at least two
months out in response to an unexpected target
change. Moreover, there is some indication that the
larger the unexpected target change, the more likely
it is that the market will revise its expectation for
the funds rate.
Our most important finding is that greater
transparency appears to help. Not only is the market
better able to anticipate funds rate target changes,
but it appears that the market is able to anticipate
such changes further in advance. This is important
since changes in the funds rate target can have a
significant effect on economic variables only by
generating changes in longer-term interest rates.
The Fed can only affect long-term rates by affecting
market participants’ expectations for the future funds
rate. The further in advance the market can antici-
pate changes in the funds rate, other things the same,
the larger will be the corresponding changes in
longer-term rates. Moreover, in such an environment,
market responses in anticipation of policy actions
begin to stabilize the economy long before the policy
actions themselves occur.
The interaction of economic policy and market
expectations has been a core feature of macro-
economics for 30 years. In this paper we documented
the substantial change in the predictability of mone-
tary policy that occurred in 1994. The period since
1994 has also been one of remarkable economic
stability. We believe that the greater transparency
of monetary policy has contributed to this outcome. 
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